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Abstract
One of the defining features of contemporary Europe is the freedom of movement
of persons. Despite its advantages, this ‘freedom of movement’ is also contested,
since it has been shown to cause discrimination, exploitation and pave the way for a
‘race to the bottom’. How can we understand the social-economic consequences of
free movement in Europe? To answer this question, we developed a typology along
the dimensions value of work and degree of power which delivers four ideal types of
labour relationships: exploitative, deprived, greedy and esteemed. This has been
applied to Central and Eastern European (CEE) workers in Austria, the Netherlands
and Sweden.
Our study shows dual labour market strategies of both capital and labour agents,
using on the one hand strategies of cost minimisation, and on the other hand
compliance strategies and dual frames of reference, both of which contribute to a
low degree of freedom and a low value of work. It addresses the responsibility and
significance of both capital and labour contributing to exploitative and greedy
relationships throughout all three cases. The results contribute to a more balanced
understanding of the responsibilities towards the ‘shadow sides’ of free movement in
the EU, as it shows that not all free movement of persons is totally free. Moreover,
instead of bold political statements, it demonstrates the relevance of a more
differentiated perspective on the downsides and benefits of European free movement.
Keywords: Commodification, EU mobility, CEE migration, Labour market relationships,
Ideal types
Introduction
‘[…] the new social realm transformed all modern communities into societies of
laborers and jobholders’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 46)
The EU ‘enlargements’ or ‘accessions’ of 2004 and 2007 have come to shed a new
light on the European project. New member states joined the EU, which led to large
amounts of Central and Eastern European (e.g. Polish, Hungarian and Romanian)
workers moving to West-European countries (such as Austria, Sweden and The
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Netherlands). Since CEE migrants have become one of the most significant categories
of mobile EU citizens to arrive in the ‘old’ European member states, we primarily focus
on ‘CEE’ (Central and Eastern European) mobile workers or ‘migrants’ in our analysis.
Soon after the enlargements, European mobility rose to the top of the political and
media agenda in France, Italy and Britain (Favell & Nebe, 2009). Academics have also
shown the danger of discrimination and exclusion of EU labour within ‘a regime of ex-
ploitable and controllable labour’ (McDowell, Batnitzky, & Dyer, 2009; McKenzie &
Forde, 2009; Skrivankova, 2010; Fox, Morşoanu, & Szilassy, 2014; McGauran, de Haan,
Scheele, & Winsemius, 2016; Glick-Schiller, 2009, p. 124).
While these studies deliver rewarding empirical micro-level insights about the conse-
quences of free movement, theoretical meso- or macro-level dynamics between em-
ployers and employees remains a somewhat underdeveloped topic. Or, as stated by
Fudge and Strauss (2014), p. 3: “While these processes […] have been explored individu-
ally, there has been relatively little work to date that has attempted to explore the link-
ages between them”. This is surprising because – with the free movement of people as
one of the key instruments to optimise the European ‘Single Market’ – it is important
to understand the market relationships between employers and employees. To do so,
we focus on this relationship in three member-states with a comparable and significant
inflow of EU mobile citizens, yet with different institutional settings and varying transi-
tory regimes: the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria. The main research question is:
‘What is the character of socio-economic relationships between capital and labour
agents concerning the free movement of people in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden?’
To answer this, we use data from a multiple stakeholder analysis (online surveys, inter-
views and focus groups) with respondents in the three countries.
The first part of this article includes a theoretical conceptualization of the relation-
ship between capital and labour, resulting in a typology of ideal-typical relationships ac-
cording to two dimensions: the degree of power and the value of work. The second part
of the article presents the empirical findings and analyses. The final part reflects on the
findings and relate to the debate considering the downsides and benefits of free move-
ment of persons in Europe.
The commodification of European mobile work
In contemporary studies, the vast body of literature on ‘renewed’ European East-west
migration has often focused on analysing stocks and flows, on migration patterns, con-
tributions to labour migration and integration (Guild & Mantu, 2011; Gabriel &
Pellerin, 2008; Menz & Caviedes, 2010; Engbersen, Leerkes, Grabowska-Lusinska, Snel,
& Burgers, 2013). With the change in the European legal-political framework and the
increase of free movement, academic interest also shifted to post-accession migration,
addressing issues of labour market segmentation and de-qualification (Black, Engbersen,
Okolski, & Pantiru, 2010, Glorius, Grabowska-Lusinska, & Rindoks, 2013; McGauran, de
Haan, Scheele, & Winsemius 2016). There is a growing awareness among migration
scholars that although EU-internal migrants have the same rights as citizens in the
receiving EU countries, they may still face significant barriers and have ‘integration
needs’ similar to migrants from outside of the EU (Collett, 2013; Reeger, forthcoming).
These needs relate mostly to language skills and access to information, especially con-
cerning the host country labour market (Ciupijus, 2011; Reeger & Enengel, 2015).
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The perception and continued description of EU migrants as particularly hardworking
and their use as such also hinders their social participation and language learning, as
seen for example in the British context (McKenzie & Forde, 2009). But is this really
the case? Since we have various studies on single cases and on the position of employees or
employers in these cases, we study the meso-perspective between employers and employees
in several European countries from a comparative and more inter-relational perspective.
The free movement of people is regarded as an important component in ‘creating a
European employment market’ (Eurobarometer, 2004; Heinz & Ward-Warmedinger,
2006, p. 7), whereby EU citizens are obliged to have comprehensive resources at their
disposal so as not burden the welfare state system of their host countries. Having a
working relationship or contract (with a company, an employer or with themselves as
self-employed) is therefore a defining element of their legal status (Rosewarne, 2010;
Ruhs & Anderson, 2010; Snel, Faber, & Engbersen, 2015). Consequently, mobile citizens
are de facto mobile workers on a mobile market. Therefore, we approach European
freedom of movement primarily as a market phenomenon. One of the most defining
characteristics of a liberal market is the commodification of labour1 (Polanyi, 2001;
Shields & Grant, 2010, p. 61),2 a situation where work is freely bought and sold as
‘labour’ on a market at a market price, such as ‘wages’ (Polanyi, 1977, p. 13). Conse-
quentially, through market mechanisms, labourers can (and will) be transformed into
tradable commodities (Polanyi, 2001; Marx, 1978/2010).3 We take labour commodification
as a conceptual starting point in understanding European free movement. In contrast to
other studies, however, we conceptualise labour commodification as a relational ra-
ther problematizing concept to understand market relationships (Papadopoulos, 2005;
Shields & Grant, 2010; Rosewarne, 2010).4 In other words, labour commodification is
not considered inherently problematic or negative in a normative sense, but as a rela-
tional concept for understanding the relationship between capital and labour agents in
the liberal market of the EU (Anderson, 2010). To study these relations between market
actors, we include two elements in the analysis: the degree of power and the value of
work. In the following, we explain how both elements are operationalised.
Labour commodification as a relational process
‘Immigration can be seen as a labor-supply system particularly suited to the needs of
firms where the organisation of the labor process entails low wages and powerless
labor’ (Sassen, 1988, p. 40).
Degree of power
Some scholars have argued that labour power is a mere fiction and that employers do
not buy labour power, but rather ‘the power to command’ (Anderson, 2000). For
workers to counterweigh this, a defining element is to what extent the individual
worker holds agency, understood as ‘exerting some degree of control over the social rela-
tions in which one is enmeshed, which in turn, implies the ability to transform these so-
cial relations to some degree’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 20). In light of this, we adhere to a
gradual definition of the degree of (worker) power as a ‘continuum’ of (un)freedom
(Ruhs & Anderson, 2010; Fudge & Strauss, 2014).
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Furthermore, labour agency can be restricted by institutional, cultural or regulatory
constraints to make independent decisions (Fitzgerald, 2007; Holgate, 2005; Favell &
Nebe, 2009; Fox, Morşoanu, & Szilassy, 2014). Conversely, when constraints are limited
and dependencies are legally separated and regulated, this could stimulate labour
agency. It can also be stimulated by transparent, accessible and available information
about rights and duties vis-à-vis employers.5 This applies to self-employed persons as
well as other employees, especially those who are active in service-oriented professions
(e.g. the IT sector, engineering or the arts) (Salt, 2008; Kelo & Wachter, 2004). The im-
portance of information for the power relation between employers and employees has
been shown by several other studies, showing trade union membership as counter-
weighing corporate interests (Berntsen, 2015). Studies have even shown that in some
sectors workers are selected when they ‘lack power within the labour market’ since ‘it is
also their powerlessness which makes them profitable’ (Sassen, 1988, p. 40; McKenzie &
Forde, 2009, p. 155; Piore, 1979). This powerlessness can be emphasised by multiple de-
pendencies, including access to medical care, transport and housing (Van Ostaijen,
Faber, Engbersen, & Scholten, 2015). Therefore, to study the degree of power, we ana-
lyse individual and corporate investment and compliance strategies related to the
labour process and working conditions. Generally, this degree of power ‘’in which this
new arrangement of labour takes place –and its human costs- are all too rarely ad-
dressed within migration studies” (Glick-Schiller, 2009, p. 125).
Value of work
Studying European labour mobility cannot solely be done based on the degree of power.
Rather, it should also incorporate how capital and labour agents value work. Although
value of work can be defined rather broadly, this study primarily defines it as wages
next to work conditions.
This primary focus on wages is not coincidental. ‘Wage improvement’ is one of the
most commonly mentioned indicators of why EU citizens move, for instance to the
Netherlands (Engbersen, Snel, Ilies, Leerkes, & Van der Meij, 2011). However, European
movement sometimes comes at the price of low wage jobs, job insecurity and marginal
positions on the labour market (Favell & Nebe, 2009; Janta, Ladkin, Brown, & Lugosi,
2011; McDowell, Batnitzky, & Dyer, 2009; Ciupijus, 2011; Fox, Morşoanu, & Szilassy,
2014), or as Favell expressed it: ‘Ambitious “new Europeans” are in danger of becoming
a new Victorian servant class’ (Favell, 2008, p. 711). Some studies show how employers,
in their competitive corporate strategies for cost minimisation, strategically use loop-
holes and opacities to reduce labour costs by recruiting mobile workers (Fellini, Ferro,
& Fullin, 2007; Houwerzijl, 2014; Berntsen, 2015). Such cost minimisation strategies
limit the valuation of work, in terms of suppressed wage levels (Ruhs & Anderson,
2010). However, this does not always have to be the case since wages can still be high
or in accordance with national norms. This is mostly the case for knowledge workers,
highly skilled expats and creative professionals (Iredale, 1999; 2001). Nevertheless, be-
ing highly educated or highly skilled does not safeguard a person from the undervalu-
ation of work. Studies also show that much talent and human capital is wasted due to
‘downward mobility’, ‘undervaluation’ and problems of de-qualification (Kelo & Wach-
ter, 2004; Favell & Nebe, 2009).
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Next to corporate valuation, we focus on the individual valuation of work. This can-
not be done by adopting a fixed approach to wages, since studies have shown that mo-
bile employees sometimes accept a lower socio-economic position in the short run as
an investment for their career in the long run (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010; Pietka, Clark,
& Canton, 2013). Such compliance or coping mechanisms can become part of tactics
to increase income and save on household expenditure (Datta et al., 2007; Holgate,
2013). An initial acceptance of low-paid jobs is found in both low-skilled and high-
skilled work (Iredale, 1999; 2001; Voitchovsky, 2014; Glorius et al., 2013; Lillie & Greer,
2007; Berntsen & Lillie, 2012). This highlights the importance of time as a factor in the
valuation of work by mobile employees. As time passes and social contacts, language skills
and information resources increase, the willingness to comply decreases (Piore, 1979;
Anderson, 2010; Datta et al., 2007). For example, Dutch research indicates that almost
40% of the Bulgarian population in the Netherlands complied with lower wages than
the legal standard of minimum wages (Engbersen et al., 2011, p. 44). Comparing their
situation with the Dutch standard but also with the situation of peers in the country of
origin, this is known as a ‘dual frame of reference’ when immigrants compare their situ-
ation with their country of origin (Suarez-Orozco, 1987; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003).
This makes wage valuation an ambiguous and complex element in the individual valu-
ation of work, and shows the importance of taking time and contextual factors into ac-
count. Table 1 offers a concise overview of the elements and indicators that guide our
study.
This conceptualisation of labour commodification enables a sketch of four ideal types,
understood as “constructed concepts endowed with a degree of consistency, seldom found
in actual history” (Weber, 2002, p. 55). Ideal types draw attention to specific features of
a phenomenon, in order to build a picture of its key characteristics to reveal and ex-
plain social phenomena. Combining these two dimensions, ‘value of work’ (weak and
strong) and ‘degree of power’ (weak and strong) result in four ideal-types of labour-
capital relationships which are visualised in Fig. 1 in four quadrants:
1. Unvalued dependency (low value/low power) combines a low exchange value with a
low degree of power. This type is termed ‘exploitative relationship’;
Table 1 Operationalisation of labour commodification
Degree of power
Elements Defined as Indicators
Individual strategies Investment or compliance
strategies for labour agency
Valuation of labour agency (Independency and
autonomy in work decisions, information, trade
union membership, voice)
Corporate strategies The use of resources to
invest in labour agency
Fulfilment and valuation of agency conditions
(Autonomy in work floor decisions, accessibility
of information, trade union membership)
Value of work
Elements Defined as Indicators
Individual strategies Investment or compliance
strategies for labour activity
Valuation of primary and secondary labour
conditions (wages, information, contractual and
collective agreements)
Corporate strategies The usage of resources for
development or investment
in labour
Fulfilment and valuation of primary and secondary
labour conditions (wages, information, contractual
and collective agreements)
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2. Unvalued independency (low value/high power) combines a low exchange value
with a high degree of power. This type is termed ‘deprived relationship’;
3. Valued dependency (high value/low power) is a combination of a high exchange
value of work with a low degree of power. This type is termed ‘greedy relationship’;
4. Valued independency (high value/high power) is a combination of a high exchange
value of work with a high degree of power. This type is termed efficacious or
‘esteemed relationship’.
We expect low-skilled workers to be mostly in exploitative relationships because of
low work valuation (wages) and a low autonomy on work-related decisions, which de-
creases employee agency (Expectation 1). We expect low-skilled workers contracted by
temporary employment agencies mostly in greedy relationships because their wages
regularly meet economic and legal standards, but because of clustered contracts, they
depend on their temporary employment agency in a range of social domains such as
housing, social security and transport services (Expectation 2). Based on the work of
Coser (1974), ‘greediness’ indicates when organisations demand ‘total dedication’ of
their members and try to ‘limit the demands of competing roles and status positions’.
When the value of work is seen as convenient but when personal and professional free-
doms are minimal, we typify this as a greedy relationship. Subsequently, we expect self-
employed persons to be in deprived relationships, because they have formally a high de-
gree of power or freedom to commodify their work, but because of their individuality,
they largely do not profit from collective agreements, which could lead to underpay-
ment or self-exploitation (Expectation 3) (Reeger & Enengel, 2015; Berntsen, 2015). Fi-
nally, we expect highly skilled workers to be in esteemed relationships because their
labour potential is mostly valued according to legal standards (by wages and secondary
conditions) and they maintain a relatively high degree of power, independence and au-
tonomy in their labour market position (Expectation 4) (Florida, 2002). For this expect-
ation to be met, it is important that highly skilled workers have highly skilled positions,
since alternative studies also show the undervaluation of highly skilled persons in low
Fig. 1 Typology of labour-capital relationships. Holds mainly descriptive and explorative value. It does not
assume a causal relationship between both axes, but based on existing literature, we combined insights to
formulate expectations. Source: own design
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skilled positions (Trevena, 2013; Reeger & Enengel, 2015). Overall, we expect that low-
skilled mobile workers will most likely cover the left rectangle of Fig. 1 (quadrant A, C
or D) while highly skilled mobile workers most likely cover the right rectangle of Fig. 1
(quadrants A, B and D) (Jordan & Duvell, 2002). We will now apply these ideal types
to our empirical case studies. For that purpose, we completed a multiple stakeholder
analysis, introduced below.
Methods
This study involves an in-depth qualitative case study of labour-capital relationships
within the European freedom of movement, specifically focusing on East–west labour
movements.6 Intra-EU mobility was selected as a strategic case for the understanding
of labour commodification due to its distinct liberal-economic objectives and its
market-led character.
To answer our research question we studied stakeholder assessments in three coun-
tries that had taken part in the IMAGINATION research project.7 ‘Stakeholders’ are
defined as actors who deal professionally with European mobility, selected on the basis
of their professional affiliation, and distributed across public, private and NGO sector.
These stakeholders were professionals working at temporary labour agencies, employ-
ment services, chambers of commerce, employers’ organisations, workers’ organisa-
tions, civil society migrants’ organisations and civil servants on the local and national
level. Table 4 in Appendix shows an anonymised list of respondents used for quotations
in this article. By studying the assessments of professionals dealing with ‘mobile work’
in a broader sense, we were able to trespass direct tense or conflicting interests be-
tween employers versus employees. In other words, we did not interview employers or
EU workers active on the labour market, but instead, approached professionals whose
work relates to ‘mobile workers’, who are or have been a ‘mobile worker’ in the past, or
are otherwise professionally affiliated to issues regarding ‘mobile work’. The profes-
sionals are therefore able to reflect on relational elements from a distant and more re-
flective perspective.
This multiple stakeholder analysis was designed as part of a stepwise research meth-
odology, including an online survey, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The
online survey was carried out in spring of 2014 and resulted in 129 returned question-
naires in the three countries (see Table 2), a response rate of about 80%.8 The survey
served as a mapping exercise, establishing a primary inventory of relevant implications
of CEE mobility. The questionnaire began with the stakeholders’ concrete work, tasks
and CEE clientele, followed by a core section investigating implications in different pol-
icy domains (labour market, housing etc.). In a closing section of the survey, the stake-
holders were asked to elaborate on issues they considered particularly relevant with
regards to CEE mobility. Initially we had an equal distribution of respondents per pro-
fessional domain (public, private, NGO). The online survey was followed by a series of
52 interviews with stakeholders. Almost all the interviews were conducted during sum-
mer/autumn of 2014. Respondents were asked about what they professionally perceived
as the implications of intra-EU mobility, in four main domains: the labour market;
housing and neighbourhood; registration, social security and participation; language
and education. Comparing these four domains, labour market implications were most
prominent, delivering in-depth insights about the relationship between employers and
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employees. For the selection of respondents, we used the same professional affiliation
criteria as the online survey. Following on from the survey and interviews, we con-
ducted focus groups in which participants were again selected based on their profes-
sional affiliation. Sometimes respondents were asked twice to participate, since the aim
of the focus group was to gain new knowledge, but also deepen the understanding of
and corroborate the results from the survey and interview findings. Table 2 summarises
the number of respondents in all cases.
All focus groups and interviews were recorded, transcribed and subject to qualitative
document analysis after approval by the participating stakeholders. This was all part of
comparative data analysis grids, exchanged within the project IMAGINATION. The
analysis of the data was based on theoretical and empirical confrontation, taking an
abductive approach: Positioned between inductive and deductive reasoning (Timmer-
mans & Tavory, 2012). By back-and-forth reasoning (Berg & Lune, 2004), the data were
analysed by the grid which all had to relate to the four identified domains. To increase
reliability, several rounds of interpretations were undertaken and discussed in the re-
search groups and between the researchers.
Finally, it is important to mention the biases in the research design. A multiple stake-
holder approach implies a problem-oriented perspective because the professionals’ daily
work is focused on dealing with issues and problems related to CEE migration. We also
acknowledge that by interviewing professionals about ‘implications’, most respondents
will focus on the most ‘visible’ and ‘pressing’ implications. In other words, interviewing
professionals about ‘implications’ has a risk of overemphasising ‘problems’ within spe-
cific sectors. While we acknowledge this as a bias in our research design, we aim to
compensate that effect using data triangulation.
Background: EU mobility in The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria
The Austrian, Dutch and Swedish cases were selected as revelatory case studies (Yin,
1996) as these countries experienced a relatively significant increase in mobile workers
through the EU-enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (see Fig. 2). Next to this, all three
countries had different transitory regimes in opening their labour markets for European
workers: Sweden was among the first European member-states opening their labour
market for A8 countries in 2004, the Netherlands followed in 2007, while Austria ex-
tended the transitional arrangements until 2011.
Table 2 Numbers of respondents in the three stages of data gathering
Urban region Online survey Interviews Urban Living Lab
Austria Linz N = 23 N = 8 (9) N = 8
Vienna N = 23 N = 5 (7)
National level – N = 1
The Netherlands The Hague N = 15 N = 5 N = 16
Rotterdam N = 15 N = 5
National level N = 16 N = 2
Sweden Gothenburg N = 22 N = 8 (12) N = 30
Stockholm N = 15 N = 5 (7)
National level – N = 4
Source: Reeger & Enengel, 2015
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The case studies also feature diversity in their political-institutional structure and
socio-economic outlook, shown in Table 3.
These variances guided the comparative case study approach. We will now proceed
with a concise overview of each case study country.
The Dutch case
Historically, the Netherlands played a founding role in the establishment of the EU and
the euro and has been a proponent of the European free movement regulations
(Hollander, 2013). Migration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the
Netherlands did not begin with the EU-enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the number of
(officially registered) residents from CEE countries did however increase rapidly. In the
late 1990s, there were about 50,000 CEE residents in the Netherlands, in 2003, shortly
before the EU enlargement of 2004, this number had grown to 62,000, adding up to
120,000 CEE residents (Statistics Netherlands, 2012). Previous research on the labour
market position of this population, indicated that a large majority of recently arrived
CEE migrants in the Netherlands had (employed or self-employed) work (Dagevos, J.
(red.), 2011; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013). Others found that this work was mostly based
on flexible employment relations, or even on an informal basis (Engbersen et al., 2011).
Most studies found that CEE migrants are generally concentrated in elementary occu-
pations, particularly in the Dutch horticulture, but also in construction, cleaning, cater-
ing and in private households (Dagevos, J. (red.), 2011; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013).9
Engbersen et al. (2011, 2013) indicate that the majority of their respondents (62%) were
either unskilled manual or agricultural workers. However, they also found that some
Fig. 2 Number of CEE residents in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden before and after EU-enlargements
of 2004 and 2007. Source: Sert, 2014
Table 3 Political-institutional outlook case studies
Country Austria Netherlands Sweden
Politico-administrative model Federal Unitary decentralized Unitary
State - Social partners relation Corporatist Semi Corporatist Non Corporatist
Type of Welfare State Conservative Mixed Social Democratic
Opening of the labour market (A8) 2011 2007 2004
Source: Zelano, Bucken-Knapp, Hinnfors, & Spehar, 2016
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CEE migrants were working in ‘higher service’ occupations. These studies showed that
CEE migrants are a more differentiated group than often expected, including low,
medium and highly skilled migrants, while this last category more limited.
One of the most important labour market specificities in the Dutch case is the signifi-
cant role of temporary employment agencies, as one of the main providers of mobile
work (Fellini et al., 2007; Brinkmeijer, 2011). The large agricultural and horticultural
sector in the southern and western parts of the Netherlands see these intermediaries
play a pivotal role in the brokerage of capital and labour. Consequentially, this large
sectoral demand creates a substantial amount of low-skilled mobile work in the
Netherlands (Engbersen et al., 2011, 2013; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013), an important
specificity regarding the Dutch case.
The Swedish case
Sweden joined the EU in 1995, and after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, Sweden
(alongside Ireland and the UK) decided to open-up the labour market to new EU citizens
entirely and abstain from any transitional arrangements. Very soon after this opening of
the labour market, a conflict arose that still characterises discussions about the Sweden-
EU relationship. A company hired Latvian workers to construct a school in the municipal-
ity of Vaxholm, without collective agreement. After national court proceedings, the Court
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) finally ruled that the blockade represented a re-
striction on freedom to provide services under Article 49EC. The series of events, known
as ‘the Vaxholm case’ or simply ‘Laval’, has become a strong national narrative, and serves
as a metaphor of how the ‘Swedish model’, founded on independent negotiations between
labour and business, is challenged by the free movement of labour. The work conditions
of low-skilled, manual labour in general and of posted workers specifically, have since
been a constant factor in the political debate.
CEE migrants can be found in all sectors of the Swedish labour market, but predom-
inantly in construction, forestry and the sector for private household services (mostly
cleaning). Employment relations in these sectors are mixed, contracts range from for-
mal and semi-formal to purely informal ones. Estimations of the ‘true’ population of
posted workers and informal workers in Sweden vary significantly between employer
and employee organisations. According to the official register of posted workers, ap-
proximately 40% of posted workers during the first half of 2014 came from the CEE re-
gion, especially Poland (Swedish Work Environment Authority, 2014).
The Austrian case
Austria joined the EU in the same year as Sweden, in 1995, after a referendum in 1994
with 67% of eligible voters being ‘pro EU’. As to transitional provisions, Austria lobbied
along with the Netherlands and Germany for implementing these restrictions for as
long as possible in order to protect its labour market (Kraler, 2011, p. 37). The transi-
tional arrangements were finally abolished in 2011 and 2013. At the beginning of 2016,
more than 360,000 CEE citizens were registered in Austria, out of which Romania
(82,971) and Croatia (70,255), Hungary (63,608) and Poland (57,604) were the most
common countries of origin. In total, the share of CEE citizens in the population
amounts to 4.2% (Fassmann, Kohlbacher, & Reeger, 2014).
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CEE migrants can be found in all parts of the Austrian economy and in all kinds of
positions. The longer duration of the transitional provisions resulted in an above aver-
age share of self-employed CEE citizens, as this was one of few viable ways to work in
Austria during the transition period. Still, these self-employed are often manual
workers in positions that do not match their qualifications compared to non-migrants.
It has also been shown, that the longer CEE migrants stay, the more likely they are to
be able to obtain jobs matching their qualifications as they improve their language
skills, widen their networks and improve their knowledge of the Austrian labour mar-
ket (Fassmann, Kohlbacher, & Reeger, 1995, p. 38).
One factor that marks Austria out a special case compared to the Netherlands and
Sweden is its spatial proximity to the CEE region. All the numbers given so far refer to
officially registered CEE migrants and thus provide only a part of the bigger picture.
For people working in Austria and living ‘at home’ in e.g. Slovakia or Hungary, there is
no need to register and they are thus not included in population statistics. There are,
e.g. about 50,000 women from CEE active in care work in private households, going
back and forth on a biweekly or monthly basis. Spatial proximity thus brings along
forms of mobility that are not feasible in the Netherlands or Sweden.
We will now turn to a discussion of the results on labour-capital relationships in the
case study countries. We present the results along the lines of the analytical grid [cor-
porate and individual strategies], and not case-to-case, to offer a comparative
perspective.
Results
Corporate strategies
First of all, especially regarding low-skilled work, Austrian, Dutch and Swedish respon-
dents indicated that employers actively search for the cheapest and easiest labour op-
tions. In all national settings, employers need to pay a legally defined minimum wage,
depending on a worker’s age and specific area of work. But even with such legal stan-
dards, wage variation occurs, described here by a representative of a temporary employ-
ment agency in the Netherlands:
‘There are large wage differences between native and mobile workers. Every person
encounters that, sooner or later, they will see that they get lower wages for the same
work than Dutch people, which has been the case for years now’ (Matti).
Dutch respondents confirmed that this is also one of the main reasons employers ac-
tually prefer mobile workers, as stated by a representative of a temporary employment
agency, they are ‘cheaper and more profitable’ (Jonas). The Swedish local ombudsmen
in Stockholm and Gothenburg also indicated that CEE workers work longer hours, for
less money and are exposed to more risk than Swedish workers, as one representative
of the Workers Union in Sweden describes:
‘These construction corporations blame each other for having cheap labour force on
their constructions. All the time, the focus is to keep the expenses low and they know
very well what they are doing. They know that they can pay these workers a lot less
than native Swedes and thus earn a lot of money using underhand means (Dennis).
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The contracts are not necessarily informal, but range from purely informal to semi-
formal ones. According to Swedish trade union representatives in the construction sec-
tor, free movement has blurred the distinction between formal and informal labour
contracts, as perfectly legal employment arrangements can coexist alongside more du-
bious setups on the same construction site. This creates a complex picture of long con-
tract chains and a blurry distribution of responsibilities between contractors. Again, the
representative of the Workers Union in Sweden talks about this complexity:
‘The workers are getting the right salary, but it is not a question of salary, it is a
question of taxes. (…) The corporations are not paying the right taxes. It is the same
if you work for a Swedish employer, and you get your net payment, but not your
payslip. And if you do receive your payslip, the taxes are not specified on it. When
you 1 day declare your taxes, the Tax Agency is wondering why you have not paid
your taxes - and you do not have a payslip to show how much you owe. Then it is up
to you to pay what you are taxable, that should have been paid by your employer’
(Dennis)
Such tax evasion strategies make it possible for some employers to pay less than they
should. There findings can be seen reflected in all three national samples, dominated
by the perception that employers are first and foremost – and not only with regard to
CEE workers – interested in cheap labour. As one representative of the Austrian Public
Employment Service indicates:
‘The goal is to find good personnel for as little money as possible, the best and least
complicated persons’ (Martin).
Cost-minimisation strategies cause employers to avoid searching for native workers,
as they need to pay higher wages to them than they do for mobile (foreign) workers. At
the same time, premiums and taxes on mobile worker pay are not always imposed as
they should be. This tax discrimination generates a nationality based approach, also in-
dicated by Dutch employers, which leads to ‘group-to-group’ thinking, where employers
select workers on the basis of their national background (see: McKenzie & Forde,
2009). In Austria too, one respondent indicated that: ‘It happens frequently, that em-
ployees with a migrant background doing the same job get less salary than Austrian co-
workers. There are skilled workers getting the same amount of money as low-skilled
workers. A clear case of discrimination by the employer’ (Paul). Similarly, trade union
representatives in Sweden gave voice to a similar nationality-based focus of employers,
that is eventually mirrored in the organisation of labour:
‘There is an increasing practice to mix Swedish and EU labour. It doesn’t work. In the
end the Swedes are out of work. They train them, and once they are trained, they
force out the Swedish labour. The Swedes themselves have been very stupid. Because
they have let other people do their work. Alternatively, if you allow that, these people
should have done so according to collective agreements’ (Andreas)
This nationality-based approach is not only guided by economic incentives, but also
by the information resources of workers. As stated by one Dutch respondent of a
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temporary labour agency: if one group ‘knows enough’ about their alternatives and op-
portunities, employers likely switch to another group:
‘Two or 3 years ago I was really busy with selling Polish personnel well. […] Now, we
have a bit the same problem as back then. I hear from my customers: Those Polish
people are a bit too experienced with the work here, the conditions, rules… maybe it
is time for a new Polish person!’ (Matti).10
Having less knowledge of rights, duties, legal status and labour market position can
perversely result in a higher valuation by the employer, while at the same time weaken-
ing the power of the individual worker. As an example, some Dutch employers value
the lack of Dutch language skills, because knowing Dutch can be an indicator for
‘someone who knows too much’. As stated by a representative of a temporary employ-
ment agency:
‘Most of those people speak the language. Previously, that was an advantage. Now
this is for some customers (companies hiring temporary personnel, MvO) a
disadvantage. Because with the knowledge of language they begin to talk too much
and too fast with other people, comparing salaries. And they are not busy with their
work. But only with living, let’s say it like that.’(Matti).
Instead of investing in human capital or making information transparently accessible,
this indicates that employers experience a range of incentives to limit resources of in-
formation. This emerges as a corporate strategy to minimise resources invested in em-
ployee development [value of work]. The educational background, qualifications,
independency or autonomy are not always rewarded to meet working aims. Austrian
stakeholders also indicated that insufficient information was provided, especially by
intermediaries in the countries of origin:
‘Experiences with these agencies are rather bad. They do not inform the care workers
properly prior to their work in Austria, they consciously don’t, because they make a
lot of money from this disinformation’ (Barbara).
This shows similarities with the Dutch situation; Dutch temporary employment agen-
cies officially need to provide Dutch employees with information booklets about work,
rights, duties and information about their collective agreement. However, this is not
met in practice, as one representative of a temporary labour agency (Joachim) stated ‘in
the end, it is the responsibility of the individual worker’.
Furthermore, some employers indicated that they add ‘services’ (such as insurance
contracts, travel and housing accomodations) to the labour contract. For example, one
Dutch temporary employment agency stated that they have ‘700 bikes’ to reduce trans-
portation costs. In this way, some Dutch employment agencies hold an umbrella ap-
proach with all-inclusive practices like a representative of Dutch temporary
employment agencies indicated:
‘Yes, it was just a package-deal […]. So, recruitment, selection, transport, housing,
labour, labour-housing transport, this was all within that package. And what we see
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now is that all the different parts, it becomes more a model of choice. […] This makes
it a bit unmanageable. And also a bit less comprehensible’ (Joachim).
Such temporary employment agencies cluster different services into one com-
prehensive labour contract as a corporate strategy of cost minimisation. This
comprehensive approach is mostly framed as a service oriented model, but when
‘housing’ or other services become a labour condition, this limits the possibilities
for employees to ‘vote with their feet’ (Joachim) and it increases the possibility
for employment agencies ‘to do something wrong’ (Matti) as two representatives
of employment agencies indicated [degree of freedom]. Next to the Dutch exam-
ples, Swedish stakeholders reported that dependency occurs when the landlord
and the employer are the same person. If employees lose their job, they also be-
come homeless. Some Dutch employers mentioned the ‘manipulative’ character
when housing is part of the labour contract of employees, causing ‘double de-
pendencies’ and making workers more vulnerable, decreasing employee agency
and locking the employee into a more subordinate position [degree of freedom].
As a result, employees are afraid to speak up, as they risk repercussions such as
losing their job, their house and their social network. In summary: Wages, con-
tracts and collective agreements are managed within a European framework and
equal to all European mobile workers in theory. However, in practice, stimulated
by profit-maximising and cost-minimising strategies of employers, our data indi-
cate unequal treatment of mobile workers based on their national background,
legal status and how well-informed they are. Oftentimes, these three aspects are
mutually reinforcing, perpetuating the vulnerable position of workers in relation
to their employers.
Individual strategies
In this section, we move on to the individual strategies that highlight employer-
employee relations. In our data, Dutch respondents indicated that some workers
accept (temporary) jobs which do not match their educational profile. This points
to individual compliance strategies and investment tactics to confine their educa-
tional profile in the short run to invest in their socio-economic profile in the long
run. Over time, this could cause ‘dequalification’, ‘deskilling’ or the ‘undervaluation’
of human capital. In Austria, employers are aware that they recruit staff with
higher or sometimes simply other qualifications than required, benefiting without
actually compensating:
‘Yet people come who are better qualified and take up jobs where they earn more
than at home. So highly qualified people take up low-qualified jobs like sitting at
supermarket checkouts. Still they earn much more and often know German well …
For those who come from Slovakia and Hungary, low-wage jobs are in fact high-wage
jobs’ (Martin).
By accepting a more subordinate position, mobile workers compromise autonomy,
voice and independence in the short run, aspiring for improvement in the near future
[degree of freedom]. Dequalification develops out of a lack of information about the
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recognition of qualifications, combined with weak networks, insufficient language
skills and a low demand in certain high-skilled professions, contributing to their vul-
nerability. This highlights the significance of accessible and high quality information
as well as the ability to act on it, or ‘to speak up’. Multiple Dutch respondents indi-
cated that mobile workers are only nominally aware of their rights and have limited
capabilities to gain additional information, especially those with a low socio-economic
status [value of work & degree of freedom] because of their ambition to improve their
wages. But as stated by stakeholders in Austria, mobile workers do not have to rely
only on the information made available by employers, but can also look for
themselves:
‘Migrant communities often compensate for the lack of information, also due to a
language barrier. Sometimes they provide useful information, sometimes they put
false rumours in the world. But nobody really considers themselves to be responsible’
(Daniel).
Swedish stakeholders also indicated the limited access to information of mobile
workers. The trade union in Gothenburg reported a general lack of knowledge amongst
mobile workers about their rights. Furthermore, they noted that initial contract agree-
ments were to a large extent not met. Once in Sweden, workers have little choice but
to work for inferior conditions than initially agreed on. Therefore, varied reasons lie be-
hind the limited informational position of mobile workers, which in the end causes in-
formational asymmetries, limiting individual strategies to develop autonomy, agency
and independency [degree of freedom].
As such, mobile workers have – in theory – the opportunity to increase their
skill level and to boost their social capital, language proficiency and professional
portfolio, or as one Dutch former labour migrant indicated that especially ‘for
highly educated people, labour migration is only for the experience, broadening your
horizon. Wage is not the most important factor anymore’. The value of work per-
ceived by mobile workers is not only seen by improvements in terms of wages, but
also in terms of secondary labour conditions, gaining tacit skills, knowledge and
social capital that will strengthen their international profile [value of work]. Indeed,
some are aware of their own ‘value’, indicated by one representative of the Workers
Union in Sweden:
‘The construction corporations are recruiting workforce in their home countries and
most of them are very skilled craftsmen. The Poles have a higher income salary and
they stick together and also stay longer than those workforces that are coming in
smaller groups. The Poles know their own value.’ (Dennis)
Most workers value their work in varied ways. However, if we look at individual cases,
we see that the situation of mobile workers in most cases does not live up to these ideal
standards. Mobile workers want to improve their position and the future of their chil-
dren in terms of socio-economic status, education and care. Or, as one former migrant
worker that now works for a temporary employment agency indicated by a representa-
tive of a Dutch temporary employment agency:
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‘If I can earn 200 euro for stupid work in Poland, I’d rather prefer to earn 1000 Euro
for stupid work in the Netherlands’ (Matti).
To improve their situation, there seems to be a broad willingness to comply with low
wages, under the minimum wage level, which shows the significance of dual frames of
reference. Moreover, compliance and investment strategies are not only applied to
wages only (as saving tactic) but also more broadly to their overall social-economic and
social-cultural status.
Discussion
Before presenting our conclusions, we would like to highlight the specific limita-
tions of this study. First of all, one main limitation of our data is that most re-
spondents referred to low-skilled work, when they were asked about ‘implications
of free movement’. This can be explained by the professional affiliations of our re-
spondents (organisations working with temporary, low-skilled and informal
workers, amongst others) but as expected earlier, most respondents focused on the
most ‘visible’ and ‘pressing’ implications, which are mostly issues affecting the low-
skilled sector. Data triangulation did not overcome this overemphasis, since in all
data sources most attention was focused on the labour market domain in general
and the low skilled sector of ‘manual workers’ in particular. This overemphasis led
to a bias in our results which we will address.
Secondly, by carrying out a multi-stakeholder analysis we did not directly inter-
view employers and employees. This enabled us to include more reflective posi-
tions, but it holds limitations to observe ‘real’ relationships in the workplace. It
would have been interesting to conduct a large-scale survey and study the degree
of freedom and value of work perceived by employers and employees on a larger
scale and using a more direct approach. Future research could apply this frame-
work to study the free movement of persons in such a direct relational perspective.
Our selections give room for future research to broaden the research design. As
some results reflect findings in other countries (such as Germany, Finland and the
UK, see: Lillie & Greer, 2007), comparative studies could examine what role a dif-
ferent labour market context has on different commodified relationships. Such re-
search could contribute to our understanding of free movement from a more
differentiated perspective, including both the downsides and benefits of an even
‘freer’ Europe.
Conclusions
Let us now reflect on our theoretical expectations and our initial typology of
capital-labour relationships. First, all our cases show low or mediocre exchange
value in the value of work. Focusing on valuation in terms of wages, this is below
or in line with the minimum wage standard, while it is not strongly problematized
by both (labour and capital) agents because of strategies of cost minimisation (of
employers) on the one hand and dual frames of reference and investment strategies
(of employees) on the other. Due to compliance strategies of individual workers af-
fecting how they implement their professional and personal competencies and the
van Ostaijen et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2017) 5:6 Page 16 of 22
dual frames of reference, mobile workers accept downward rewarding since they
compare their situation not with Dutch/Swedes/Austrians but with their peers in
their country of origin.
Second, we found low degrees of freedom (autonomy, agency and independency)
in the cases studied. Employers experience, through strategies of cost minimisa-
tion, a range of incentives to limit value autonomy. Driven by competitive aims,
employers value minimal knowledge and limit language investments. Our data
even show employers’ incentives to keep employees as long as possible ‘on the
sidelines’, by not investing in their socio-economic or social-cultural position. Such
incentives are a burden for employee agency. While this is mainly unrewarded it is
also low-problematized by both labour and capital agents because of the competi-
tive aims (of employers) on the one side and compliance strategies (of employees)
on the other. Individual workers comply, hoping to invest in future improvement.
Therefore, the freedom of work is limited in valued by both labour and capital
agents.
This adds up to the point that labour-capital relations in all cases are charac-
terised by a low value of work and a low degree of freedom, adding up to exploit-
ative or greedy relationships. It shows a very specific part of the typology,
displaying that not all free movement of persons is totally free (Ciupijus, 2011).
This confirms our first and second expectation. We cannot confirm our theoretical
expectations three and four, because we did not come across esteemed relation-
ships, and evidence for deprived relationships was also limited. This might be re-
lated to the bias in our research design as regards the overemphasis of our
respondents on the low-skilled sector. However, utilising the typology was not
done with the ambition of empirically overarching all possible types, but instead it
was a heuristic tool, to conceptually approach the empirical data. Now that we
have studied the data, we see an overemphasis in esteemed and deprived relation-
ships, which can be related to our research design. However, it also of significance
that in all three countries, most respondents refer to the low-skilled sector and
define free movement in these terms. By acknowledging the limitations of our
study, we do not claim that the results can be used to generalise about the
complete labour markets of Austria, Sweden or the Netherlands, or that they are
applicable to all segments of the European labour market. However, we do think
that by focusing in on the specificities of esteemed and deprived relationships, we
do see some interesting similarities which could be an incentive for scholarly and
policy attention.
More generally, our study shows dual labour market strategies of both capital and
labour agents, with both causing a low degree of freedom and/or a low value of work.
It addresses the responsibility and significance of both actor strategies in constructing
exploitative or greedy relationships. This is an important finding, since we offer some
nuance to the sometimes sharp divide addressing the responsibilities of employers or
employees in addressing the ‘shadows’ or ‘side effects’ of free movement (Mikl-Leitner,
Friedrich, Teeven, & May, 2013, Asscher & Goodhart, 2013). Moreover, we show a
more mutual perspective in discussing the burdens of the European Internal Market.
As such, this study shows that there are always two sides of the coin and demonstrates
how both capital and labour, employer and employees, contribute significantly to an
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understanding of the unwanted side-effects of free movement. As such, it provides a
more balanced understanding of the consequences of free movement, instead of relying
on bold statements.
Secondly, while our study includes a comparative case study perspective, despite
the case variance and the political-institutional differences, our data show more simi-
larities than differences. Despite differences in transitory regimes, political compos-
ition and institutional outlook, we found striking similarities between the position of
both actors in their labour markets. In Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden we ob-
served similar cost minimisation strategies by employers next to investment or com-
pliance strategies of employees. This absence of differences could be related to the
specific case studies, but it can probably be better explained by the overall framework
of Europe as an ‘Internal Market’ in which market forces and liberal strategies play
upon capital and labour actors in a way that overrides national differences. It shows
that despite all the particularities of our cases, that transitory regimes, political com-
position and institutional outlook play a minor role in influencing transnational mar-
ket processes. Our comparative perspective shows in any case that the phenomena
we observed are not limited to member-state borders at all. This came as a surprise
and future research might want to investigate to what extent this is true in other
cases as well.
Thirdly, by highlighting exploitative or greedy relationships, this study shows
that the labour market position of European mobile workers, especially in low
skilled positions, does not differ from significantly from that of undocumented or
irregular migrants such as Third Country Nationals (Ruhs & Anderson, 2010;
Bommes & Sciortino, 2011). Of course, their legal position, rights and civic status
are different and they differ in the opportunity to move up the socio-economic
ladder (Snel et al., 2015). As our data focuses more on low-skilled positions, we
see a rather comparable picture of low rewarded exchange values and minimal
valuations on human development and autonomy, especially in those sectors of
the labour market where the potential of free movement is not fully endorsed. If
we compare mobile workers and irregular migrants, there is still some work to be
done, especially when it comes to protecting those in the most vulnerable posi-
tions on the labour market. As our respondents referred mostly to the low-skilled
sector we observed the importance of precariousness and vulnerability, something
which has striking resemblances hinting towards a ‘new Victorian servant class’ or
a ‘new precariat’, characterised by a lack of agency, stability and security (Favell,
2008; Standing, 2011). As such, it can be applauded that labour migration in low-
waged labour markets is increasingly a feature in more general debates about ‘pre-
carious work’ and the ‘new age of insecurity’ while it stays rather unclear how
‘precariousness’ and ‘vulnerability’ might be studied (Sennet, 1998; Beck, 1992;
Papadopoulos, Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008; Anderson, 2010). This study concep-
tualised labour commodification and operationalised capital-labour relationships in
such a way that concepts such as ‘precariousness’ and ‘vulnerable work’ became
visible in a comparative and interrelational way, as an analytical concept without
the sole aim making broad sweep political statements. This study aims to contrib-
ute to that debate with conceptual clarity and operationalised applicability for fu-
ture research.
van Ostaijen et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2017) 5:6 Page 18 of 22
Endnotes
1A commodity is ‘an external object which through its qualities satisfies human needs
of whatever kind’ (Marx, 1978/2010). Therefore, labour commodification is the eco-
nomic translation of work as labour.
2Polanyi argued that making this commodity the organizing principle of society
meant ‘to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market’. He calls
this a ‘commodity fiction’ (1977, p. 13).
3From an economical point of view, exploitation is understood as an inherent process
in the capitalization and commodification of labour (Marx, 1978/2010).
4From this strand of literature, social welfare policies can be de-commodification cor-
rections on the on-going blossoming of capitalism to ensure social protection mecha-
nisms, civil rights and welfare state services (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
5Studies also show the importance of ‘not knowing’ or ‘not asking too much’: Infor-
mational agency enables one to know what one does not want to know (Brinkmeijer,
2011).
6Related to the EU enlargements of 2004 (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
7Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria. The selection criteria for these three countries
are explained in the ‘background section’. For more information on the project see:
www.project-imagination.net.
8This relatively high response rate can be explained since most stakeholders on the
initial list redirected us to a colleague who was more suitable. We did not count this as
non-response.
9Dagevos, J. (red.) (2011) found that 74% of their Polish respondents worked in elem-
entary occupations; twice as many as native Dutch workers. Gijsberts and Lubbers
(2013, p. 90) found that 50% of their Polish and 40% of their Bulgarian respondents
worked in elementary occupations.
10In this statement, the respondent referred to ‘a new Polish person’ as a metaphor
for any CEE migrant.
Appendix
Table 4 List of respondents (anonymous) used for citations
Respondent Affiliation
Matti Dutch temporary labour agency
Jonas Dutch temporary labour agency
Joachim Dutch representative of temporary labour agencies
Berry Dutch NGO representative
Nick Dutch civil servant
Paul Austrian civil servant on the local level
Martin Austrian Public Employment Service
Barbara Austrian Economic Chamber
Daniel Austrian NGO representative
Dennis Representative of The Building Workers Union ‘West section’, local level
Andreas Representative of The Building Workers Union ‘section Stockholm- Gotland’
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